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THOMAS RUFFIN AND THE POLITICS OF
PUBLIC HONOR: POLITICAL CHANGE AND
THE "CREATIVE DESTRUCTION" OF PUBLIC
SPACE*
SANFORD LEVINSON **
Significant political change, especially if it rises to the level of "regime
change," is often accompanied by the strategic reorganization of the
public landscape by those assuming power. Common examples range
from the renaming of streets, airports, and buildings to the construction
of statues and memorials honoring those deemed "heroes" by the new
regime. This very often entails the effacement of old names and the
destruction of old statues and memorials, particularly if the "heroes" of
the displaced regime are viewed as "villains" by the new one. This
Article asks if there is anything truly objectionable about such
destruction. Do we really have a duty to past regimes, even if they were
oppressive, to maintain their artifacts in the kinds of public spaces
where they were designed, at least in part, to help manufacture an
approving public consciousness? Conversely, is it perfectly proper to
engage in a version of what the economist Joseph Schumpeter termed
"creative destruction?" By examining instances of politically-
motivated destruction across the globe, this paper searches for a
general theory capable of distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible destruction. Ultimately determining that such general
principles may prove impossible to identify, the Article concludes with
suggestions as to how to most effectively conduct future debate
regarding destruction and political change.
* Copyright © 2009 by Sanford Levinson.
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
School of Law, University of Texas at Austin; Professor, Department of Government,
University of Texas at Austin. These remarks are drawn in part from Sanford Levinson,
Political Change and the 'Creative Destruction' of Public Space, in CULTURAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 341 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008). See also SANFORD
LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1998).
I am very grateful especially to Eric Muller and Sally Greene for the thought they put into
the organization of an extremely interesting symposium on the issues surrounding the
memorialization of Judge Ruffin.
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INTRODUCTION
What brought us together at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill was the opportunity to consider the proper response to
the fact that one of the residence halls on the campus of the state's
flagship public university is named after Judge Thomas Ruffin. There
is nothing unusual about public institutions honoring such purported
worthies. Sometimes decisions to confer such honor are controversial
at the time; more commonly, probably, the generational
consciousness changes and leads later generations to question the
worthiness of those selected in earlier times for such honor. Thus it is
with Judge Ruffin, who is now most notable not for his general
services to the North Carolina legal community, but rather, as the
author of what has become one of the truly canonical proslavery
decisions in American law, State v. Mann.1
While other essays will focus more on the specific career of
Judge Ruffin, this essay instead addresses far broader issues
connected with the general phenomenon of public honor and changes
in generational consciousness. Ultimately, I am interested in whether
there are any general principles that might help us decide when
choices of an earlier generation with regard to allocating public honor
should be accepted or instead rejected. Accepting as final the
decisions of our ancestors would leave the Ruffin Residence Hall
completely undisturbed; rejecting them, on the other hand, would at
the very least lead to renaming it after someone more palatable to
contemporary North Carolinians. As may be generally true of my
work, I find it far easier to raise questions than to resolve them. At
the end of the day, there may well be no principles that are likely to
satisfy all reasonable people of good faith who have different views
on the proper response to the existence of the Ruffin Residence Hall.
1. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829). Another contributor to this symposium, Harvard
Professor Mark Tushnet, has written an excellent book on the case. See generally MARK
TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN HISTORY AND
LITERATURE (2003) (presenting a comprehensive overview of the law and context of the
case).
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Still, it may be worthwhile to analyze what lawyers might term "the
question presented" and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of
proffered solutions.
I. THE TUTELARY FUNCTION OF PUBLIC NAMINGS
I begin with what ought to be two uncontroversial (though, for
some perhaps, disheartening) premises: first, all political orders are
tutelary, which means simply that all polities across time and space
have engaged, and are now engaging, in a variety of practices
designed to inculcate in their members preferred ways of viewing the
world. Such practices are especially employed, it should go without
saying, in order to enforce the legitimacy of the existing political
order. Second, all existing political orders are historically located;
they did not always exist, and there is some finite possibility that they
will not exist in the future unless they take steps to maintain
themselves. The most obvious of such steps are expenditures for
national defense against potential enemies. But, we should in no way
ignore a great deal of other governmental expenditures and actions
that are designed to reinforce the desired political culture within the
consciousness of its members.
Governmentally sponsored-or mandated-tutelage is most
obvious with regard to education of the young. Children must, after
all, be socialized in a given culture if it is to endure unto the coming
generations. But, civic education certainly takes place outside the
schoolroom door, and the young are not the only targets of such
education. Maintaining a given culture, particularly if there is any
prospect of dissent from that culture, is a full-time job for any
political regime. Anyone interested in "tutelary politics" must be
especially interested in what some analysts call "sacred space"-e.g.,
the grounds of capitol buildings, public cemeteries, great public
squares, and the like, all invested with special meaning within a given
political culture-to convey and legitimize the official ideology and
the culture it instantiates.2
Precisely because the desire of political elites-and, for that
matter, mass political movements-to manage public space on behalf
of their preferred visions is a constant, one cannot cogently criticize
the phenomenon as such without imagining a public landscape truly
"neutral" with regard to political values. Such "neutrality" would
require a public landscape devoid of almost all statues and
2. See AMERICAN SACRED SPACE 1-42 (David Chindester & Edward T. Linenthal
eds., 1995).
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monuments, as well as cities, streets, parks, and airports named only
after, say, trees or birds. Within the United States, there would be no
Washington, D.C. (or Washington State). Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas,
and Wisconsin are only the most obvious states that would have to
rename their state capitals.' Hundreds of Martin Luther King
Boulevards, Avenues, and Streets would have to be renamed.4 It is
obvious-and the obviousness is just the point-that a list of other
examples would be almost endless. Consider only the consequences
for West Virginia and South Carolina of having to strip the public
landscape of references to Democratic Senator Robert C. Byrd or
Republican Senator Strom J. Thurmond, respectively.' If one objects
to memorializing Ruffin, then Byrd, a former member of the Ku Klux
Klan, and Thurmond, a long-time segregationist who ran for the
presidency in 1948 as a "Dixiecrat," seem equally unworthy of similar
honors. Of course, the strongest version of the "neutrality" argument
would prevent us from honoring even persons who were universally
3. These capitals are, respectively, Jackson, Jefferson City, Lincoln, Santa Fe,
Bismarck, Columbus, Columbia, Austin, and Madison. Even if not all of these names are
controversial-as an almost three-decade-long resident of Austin, I certainly have never
heard anyone express unhappiness about its name-that would, I believe, count as a
contingent truth demonstrating the existence of a present political consensus rather than a
necessary truth about the eternal "honor-worthiness" of the persons named. It can
scarcely be denied that some of them might indeed be analogous to the Ruffin Residence
Hall in their capacity to raise the hackles of reasonable persons. One would scarcely
expect, for example, American Indians (or non-Indian sympathizers) to be happy about
memorializing Andrew Jackson, whose lasting legacy includes his prominent role in the
displacement of American Indians from their ancestral homes. See, e.g., ROBERT V.
REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND His INDIAN WARS 277-81 (2005) (summarizing Andrew
Jackson's legacy with regard to the relocation of Native Americans). Indeed, Native
Americans might be equally uneager to honor Christopher Columbus, whose "discovery"
of America was a catastrophe for them. See, e.g., CHARLES C. MANN, 1491: NEW
REVELATIONS OF THE AMERICAS BEFORE COLUMBUS 26-27 (2005) (describing the
Western Hemisphere as a "thriving" region that was "swept away by disease and
subjugation" after the arrival of Columbus). And devotees of "strict separation" between
church and state might be unhappy with New Mexico's homage to a Catholic saint.
4. See Derek H. Alderman, Street Names as Memorial Arenas: The Reputational
Politics of Commemorating Martin Luther King in a Georgia County, in THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN MEMORY 67, 67 (Renee C. Romano & Leigh Raiford
eds., 2006) ("Over 730 places in the country have named roads in honor of Martin Luther
King Jr."). See generally Derek H. Alderman, A Street Fit for a King: Naming Places and
Commemoration in the American South, 52 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 672 (2000) (discussing
the naming of streets after Martin Luther King, Jr.). My awareness of Alderman's work is
due to Ann Bartow's wonderful article, Trademarks of Privilege: Naming Rights and the
Physical Public Domain, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 919, 949 n.92 (2007).
5. See Bartow, supra note 4, at 934-45 (discussing the "Thurmondization" of South
Carolina); id. at 934 n.56 (listing thirty roads, institutes, dams, bridges, telescopes, schools,
and other buildings named after Byrd).
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admired. But even if one can imagine that "complete neutrality" is a
logical possibility, that vision makes no sense as a practical matter.
As already suggested, one of the things that politics is necessarily
about, as an empirical matter, is who gets to control the public
landscape, not least because no political movement has ever promised
to leave the existing landscape just as it is.
What is therefore also constant, especially in times of political
transitions, is public disputation, at least in reasonably democratic
politics, about the transformation of public space. Serious transitions,
after all, involve far more than simply new faces holding public office.
Some offices, kingships being the most obvious example, may be
eliminated. In the United States immediately after the American
Revolution, statues of royal personages simply disappeared from
public view, perhaps because they had been melted down to provide
metal for rebel armaments.6  Similarly, King's College was
transformed to Columbia University in 1784.7 Sir Walter Raleigh
may have remained the namesake of North Carolina's capital, but
one can wonder if this would have been true had the city been named
after a more recent British worthy, say Royal Governor William
Tryon, who, among other things, suppressed the Regulator
Movement in North Carolina. The Town of Tryon, North Carolina
continues to exist, but not the county that was also originally named
after him.9 Perhaps things would have been different had King
George III and his minions prevailed and the great transition that we
call the American Revolution not taken place.
There is a reason we often label such great transitions as
"monumental!" But, of course, transitions are going on all the time,
even when they are less complete than what has come to be called
"regime change." Attached to such transitions, almost inevitably, are
debates about the public landscape. Indeed, once one becomes
sensitive to such issues, it seems almost impossible to live one's life or
6. See, e.g., The Connecticut Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, King
George's Head, http://www.connecticutsar.org/articles/king-georges-head.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2009).
7. See Columbia University, A Brief History of Columbia, http://www.columbia.edu/
aboutcolumbia/history.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
8. See PAUL DAVID NELSON, WILLIAM TRYON AND THE COURSE OF EMPIRE: A
LIFE IN BRITISH IMPERIAL SERVICE 70-89 (1990).
9. See RITA WEHUNT-BLACK, GASTON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA: A BRIEF
HISTORY 37-38 (2008) (noting that the name of Tryon County was removed "in April
1779 when the eastern portion of Tryon County became Lincoln County"); Official
Government Site of the Town of Tryon, http://www.tryon-nc.com (last visited Feb. 27,
2009).
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pick up copies of daily newspapers without running into examples of
an ever-changing political scene. I offer only four examples, taken
from quite different settings around the world. The first concerns a
major American airport; the last three all involve statues (and
proposed statues) in London, Moscow, and Spain.
I confess that I am quite irritated every time I am forced to book
a plane ticket or take a cab to "Reagan National Airport."" It is not
simply that I believe that Washington was a far greater president and
should not have been displaced from "his" airport-even if it was
originally named after the city that was named after Washington
rather than directly for Washington himself. Rather, given my own
politics, I have no desire to be conscripted into identifying Ronald
Reagan as someone who deserves the honor attached to such an
appellation. As University of Arkansas professor Jay Greene and his
associates have written regarding the names given public schools,
"naming a school after someone or something provides at least an
implicit endorsement of the values that the name represents."1 At the
very least, as Ann Bartow has suggested, "naming gestures may
promote the impression" that those people "whose names ornament
public places are generous"-this is obviously most true of donors
whose gifts have enabled the building of the building-and, more
generally, especially if they are not financial benefactors,
"praiseworthy, and fairly universally well-regarded."' 2  For
constitutional lawyers, Greene's use of the word "endorsement"
evokes former Justice O'Connor's mode of interpreting the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. She read the clause
as prohibiting the state's use of religious symbols in circumstances
where onlookers could reasonably believe that the state itself is
endorsing a theological message (rather, say, than simply being the
conduit for unequivocally "private" speech). 3 Similarly, it is difficult
for many people to avoid imputing to the state itself an endorsement
10. "Many observers believe the gesture was intended both to honor former President
Ronald Reagan, and to harass Democrats and airport union members, since Reagan had
crushed PATCO, the Air Traffic Controllers Union, during his reign." Bartow, supra note
4, at 967-68 (commenting on the renaming of the airport).
11. JAY P. GREENE, BRIAN KISIDA & JONATHAN BUTCHER, MANHATTAN
INSTITUTE, WHAT'S IN A NAME? THE DECLINE IN THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOL
NAMES 2 (2007), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_51.pdf (emphasis
added).
12. Bartow, supra note 4, at 945.
13. See Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 622 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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of the central values or actions connected with specific honorees at
least in the absence of a frank acknowledgment that "naming rights"
are simply sold to the highest bidder independent of any judgment as
to the qualities of the bidder. Interestingly enough, though, I know of
no university that is publicly so crass. Would any public university,
for example, name a building after Hustler publisher Larry Flynt
despite whatever amount Flynt might be willing to pay?
One reason to "read" public landscapes through the filter of an
"endorsement test" is that we are ultimately talking about the state's
desire to construct a "civil religion"14 built upon often disputed
political values identified with particular persons the state honors by
such gestures as renaming airports or constructing monuments.
Those who opposed the national celebration of Martin Luther King's
birthday 5 might have been evil, but they were not stupid. That is,
they correctly recognized that honoring him in such a manner would
indeed be to offer a national endorsement of his vision of the
necessity of overcoming racial injustice. Perhaps some were more
perturbed by the possibility that national celebration of King's life
would be read as implicitly endorsing his view that civil disobedience,
albeit non-violent, might be appropriate as a means of fighting
injustice.16 Such opponents might be asked, of course, to explain why
they supported honoring such men as Confederate General Robert E.
Lee and President of the Confederate States of America Jefferson
Davis, often the recipients of public commemoration in the states of
the defeated Confederacy."7 Detached observers could easily view
14. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 5 (1988) (elaborating on the
notion of "civil religion").
15. The primary opponent was North Carolina Republican Senator Jesse Helms. See,
e.g., Helen Dewar, Helms Stalls King's Day in Senate, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1983, at Al,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/articles/helms-stalls-kings-
day.html. Another opponent at the time was Republican Senator John McCain, though he
later expressed regret at his opposition. See Elizabeth Bumiller & John M. Broder,
McCain Regrets Vote Against King Holiday, INT'L HERALD TRIB. (Paris), Apr. 4, 2008,
available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/04/04/america/04mccain-king.php.
16. See, e.g., MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE
CAN'T WAIT 83, 84 (1964); Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, in I HAVE A
DREAM: WRITINGS AND SPEECHES THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 101, 103 (James M.
Washington ed., 1992).
17. The monument to the Confederate dead on the grounds of the Texas State
Capitol serves as an example of the memorialization of Davis. See generally SANFORD
LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1998)
(featuring a picture of the monument on the front cover). A prominent statue of Lee sits
on Richmond, Virginia's famous Monument Avenue, devoted (save for the recently added
statue of Arthur Ashe) to memorializing Confederate "heroes." See id. at 40 (including a
picture of the statue).
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the public honoring of such individuals as teaching impressionable
youngsters (and not only them) the legitimacy of treason against the
United States. Both had, after all, taken oaths of loyalty to the
United States as American military officers and, in Davis's case, a
senator of the United States.18 Independently, there is also the
problem of memorializing those who supported, and were willing to
shed blood for, a regime devoted to maintaining chattel slavery. 9
Moving across the Atlantic Ocean to London, we could find
now-former Mayor Ken Livingston suggesting adding a statue of
former South African President Nelson Mandela to the collection of
worthies immortalized in London's Trafalgar Square,2" itself named
after one of Great Britain's great naval victories in the war against
Napoleonic France.2 Although the opposition chose to focus on what
they viewed as the aesthetic demerits of the proposed statue,
Livingston responded, altogether plausibly, that opposition was based
far more on the reluctance to open up a square that is dedicated to
memorializing Lord Nelson, the victor at Trafalgar, to someone who
18. I suppose that one might always argue that their oaths were to the Constitution of
the United States and its preservation. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Thus Confederate
apologists might maintain that the best reading of the Constitution included the possibility
of secession if it appeared that the rest of the nation was no longer willing to honor the
bargain made with slaveholders at the formation of the Union. See, e.g., Jefferson Davis,
President of the Confederate States of America, Inaugural Address of the President of the
Provisional Government (Feb. 18, 1861), available at
http://civilwarhome.com/davisinauguraladdress.htm ("The right solemnly proclaimed at
the birth of the United States, and which has been solemnly affirmed and reaffirmed in the
Bill of Rights of the States subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably
recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of
government. Thus the sovereign States here represented have proceeded to form this
Confederacy; and it is by abuse of language that their act has been denominated a
revolution.").
19. See, e.g., Alexander Stephens, Vice President, Confederate States of America,
Cornerstone Speech in Savannah, Georgia (Mar. 21, 1861), in HENRY CLEVELAND,
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 721 (1866), available at http://
teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?documentprint=76 ("Our new government
is founded upon exactly the opposite idea [of 'equality of races']; its foundations are laid,
its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man;
that slavery-subordination to the superior race-is his natural and normal condition.").
20. See, e.g., Jill Lawless, Mayor Ken Locks Horns with Tory Council of Trafalgar's
Nelson II, THE SUNDAY INDEP. (Johannesburg), Oct. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.sundayindependent.co.za/index.php?fSectionld=1042&fArticleld=2899962.
One might compare this with the ultimately successful effort led by former Virginia
Governor Douglas Wilder to add a statue of Arthur Ashe to Memorial Avenue in
Richmond, which had been devoted to honoring ostensible "heroes" of the Confederacy.
See LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 115-20.
21. See, e.g., BritishBattles.com, The Battle of Trafalgar, http://www.british
battles.com/waterloo/battle-trafalgar.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
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stands for a quite different view of the world than victory in the
endless struggle for supremacy in Europe (and, ultimately, the
world).2
On November 20, 2005 the New York Times tellingly offered an
article titled Ultimate Soviet Henchman Returns to His Pedestal,
23
detailing the fate of a statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, aptly described as
"the father of the secret police, the founder of the gulag, the man
whose people tortured and killed millions to create Lenin's dream
state." 4 One of the iconic moments of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union was the presumed destruction of that statue on August 22,
1991. As a matter of fact, though, it was not wholly destroyed but
rather moved, like other Communist-era statues, to "an
undistinguished patch of land behind the New Tretyakov Gallery,"
which was apparently called the "monster's graveyard" by
foreigners.25 According to the New York Times, however, "[e]arlier
this month, with little fanfare but plenty of dreary symbolism, Mr.
Dzerzhinsky was returned to a position of honor in central
MOSCOW. ' 26 It is, in fact, not exactly the same statue or the same
plinth, but that scarcely lessens the "dreary symbolism" involved in
returning this truly dreadful man to any place of honor.
The very fact that certain statues or names may remain in the
public square may convey valuable information about certain
unfinished business facing a given society. Thus my final example
comes from a recent story in the New York Times with the telling
headline In Spain, a Monumental Silence, which delineated an
extensive discussion of the ability of a modern democratic Spain to
confront adequately the Spanish Civil War and its aftermath. 27 The
article focuses on a law recently passed by the Spanish Parliament
requiring "that every province in the country must remove remaining
monuments to [Francisco] Franco," the long-time fascist dictator who
had prevailed in the bloody war during the 1930s. 8  The author,
22. See Lawless, supra note 20 (quoting London Mayor Ken Livinston as saying, "it's
what he represents that they don't want to see depicted, because in that square one Nelson
signifies the birth of the British empire and 100 years of global dominance [while] Nelson
Mandela would signify the peaceful transition to a multiracial and multicultural world").
23. Eleanor Randolph, Editorial, Ultimate Soviet Henchman Returns to His Pedestal,




27. Michael Kimmelman, In Spain, a Monumental Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008,
§ 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 27.
28. Id.
2009]
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Michael Kimmelman, notes that "over the years most of these
monuments have already been carted off, making the law largely
toothless and symbolic,"29 but can one really be surprised that such a
law would be passed only after a (relative) consensus had been
reached that it was time for Franco to cease being a brooding
omnipresence in the public square?
All of these recent controversies simply underscore the extent to
which political figures and the movements they purport to lead must
necessarily respond to their own pasts. The response can be critical,
as with Livingston, or embracing, as with, apparently, Putin's Russia,
but, the direction of the response may be less important than the fact
that such actions take place at all.
II. "SACRED SPACES," PUBLIC MONUMENTS, AND THE POLITICS OF
"CREATIVE DESTRUCTION"
The phenomenon of what might be called "tutelary landscaping"
is most dramatic whenever a current polity self-consciously attempts
to question its past and substitute a new view of the world, especially
in the "sacred spaces" of a given polity." Such questioning is often
simply a manifestation of an ever-changing society, but, more
importantly, when questioning leads to action, it has the potential to
dramatically affect "sacred spaces." In attempting to explain this
phenomenon, I find extremely useful a term offered by the economist
Joseph Schumpeter to describe the dynamic of capitalist economic
development. He spoke of the "creative destruction" of traditional
industries or practices and the ways of life that may be embedded in
them.3' Perhaps it is worth noting that Karl Marx, in The Communist
Manifesto, also famously wrote that one consequence of capitalism is
that "all that is solid melts into air" as long-embedded cultural
presuppositions are rendered irrelevant because of new
developments.32 Entire cultures have been radically transformed by
technological developments, even prior to our present age of
"globalization." It should be equally clear that political development
also brings in its wake, for good and for ill, similar destruction,
"creative" or otherwise, in the public landscape. I titled a short book
on this general subject Written in Stone: Public Monuments in
29. Id.
30. AMERICAN SACRED SPACE, supra note 2, at 2.
31. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86
(1942).
32. KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 7 (Gareth
Stedman Jones ed., Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1967) (1848).
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Changing Societies,33 both to evoke the particular solidity-and
promise of permanence-attached to stone and to suggest the
paradox-and, from the point of view of their creators, tragedy-that
these monuments often do not in fact endure, and not only because of
the ravages of acid rain or pollution.
Trafalgar Square in London is clearly one such sacred space,
which is precisely why Livingston's proposal evoked such strong
feelings, both negative and positive. But such spaces are present in
almost all cities and towns, whatever their size. Anyone who grew up
in North Carolina, for example, as I did in Hendersonville, was aware
of the presence in front of city halls or county courthouses of
monuments to the Confederate dead. Indeed, in my present home
city of Austin, Texas, a huge monument to the Confederate dead is
literally the first thing that a visitor to the capitol grounds passes on
the hill up to the imposing Capitol itself. A careful visitor will find
two other monuments to the Confederate soldiers and, as should be
no surprise, no such commemoration of the Union soldiers. Texas
may be far, far different from the state that constructed those
monuments at the turn of the twentieth century-or even the state to
which I moved almost thirty years ago-but the single most important
public space in Austin scarcely acknowledges these changes. By
retaining a number of Confederate monuments, Austin did not make
the same decision that Budapest later made following the collapse of
the Soviet empire to remove various Communist-era statues that used
to dominate the public landscape to a field outside the city called
"Statue Park," where the collected statuary conveys a very different
meaning from that conveyed when it dominated the great public
spaces of the city.34
Among a political culture's "sacred sites" are certainly the
campuses of state universities, especially if they are the "flagship"
campuses that, almost by definition, play an important role in
educating the states' leaders, both past and present. Again, I can
offer my own school, the University of Texas, as such an example.
Not at all surprisingly, given the dramatic changes that have taken
place in Texas, there has been continuing controversy with regard to a
series of monuments to various leaders of the Confederacy. Their
construction is owed to the generosity of a former Confederate
Major, George W. Littlefield, who in 1911 became a Regent of the
33. See LEVINSON, supra note 17, at 139 ("[Wihat is written in stone has no necessary
permanence unless successor generations can be successfully socialized to view granite as
less evanescent than a flag waving in everchanging winds.").
34. Id. at 70-73.
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University and was, apparently, its largest overall donor.35 To be
sure, the University of Texas campus now includes a statue of Martin
Luther King,36 and the University celebrates Martin Luther King's
birthday in a way that it does not celebrate President's Day.
Interestingly enough, given the occasion for the present symposium,
there is also a Littlefield dormitory, though it was apparently named
after Major Littlefield's wife Alice.37 Also relevant is another
dormitory named after William Stewart Simkins, another former
Confederate officer, who helped to organize the Ku Klux Klan in
Florida following the Civil War and, after joining the faculty of the
University of Texas Law School, delivered apologetic lectures on the
Klan.38
The naming of buildings certainly reinforces the point that any
consideration of "monuments" must go well beyond statues, even if
they are often the quickest free association when we hear the word.
It is surely important what statues dominate public squares or
university campuses, but one should also be aware of the political
dimensions that shape decisions as to what to name such squares-
and, for that matter, major streets and other venues more generally. I
have already adverted to the transformation of the Washington
National Airport into Reagan National Airport. A happier example,
for almost everyone, is the fact that travelers now arrive at the Cape
Town International Airport, although someone during the era of
apartheid would have disembarked at the Daniel F. Malan
International Airport, a striking "endorsement" of one of the
35. See The University of Texas at Austin, History of the Residence Halls,
http://www.utexas.edu/student/housing/index.php?site=8&scode=O&id=979&menu=269#w
_simkins (last visited Feb. 27, 2009).
36. See, e.g., The University of Texas at Austin, MLK Statue Ceremony at The
University of Texas at Austin Begins Day of Activities Honoring Martin Luther King Jr.
(Jan. 12, 2005), http://www.utexas.edu/news/2005/01/12/mlk/.
37. See The University of Texas at Austin, History of the Residence Halls,
http://www.utexas.edu/student/housing/index.php?site=8&scode=0&id=979&menu=269#li
ttlefields (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) (noting Littlefield's service in the Eighth Texas
Cavalry of Terry's Texas Rangers).
38. See, e.g., W. S. Simkins, Why the Ku Klux, 4 THE ALCALDE 735 passim (1916),
available at http://www.law.du.edu/russell/lh/alh/docs/simkins.html (attempting to justify
actions taken while he was "operating the Klan"). As University of Denver legal historian
Thomas Russell writes, "This article appeared in The Alcade, which is the alumni
magazine for The University of Texas at Austin; this issue was the 1916 Commencement
Issue. Simkins delivered this address as the centerpiece of the campus's Thanksgiving Day
observance in 1914." Thomas D. Russell, American Legal History, http://www.law.du.edu/
russell/lh/alh/docs/simkins.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2009) (commenting prior to
reproducing the text of the article).
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architects of that hateful system.39 Similarly, a contemporary traveler
not only goes to Russia instead of the Soviet Union, but also may well
find herself in "St. Petersburg" rather than, as in 1990, "Leningrad."
Would any of us (though, of course, the identity of the "us" in
question might be important) criticize the decision of the newly
empowered African National Congress to efface Malan's name or of
those who successfully brought to an end seventy years of Communist
domination to change the name of one of its major cities, which was,
after all, itself changed from Petrograd by the Communists who
wished to memorialize their founding leader?
Another constant of almost all contemporary societies, including
the United States, is that they are becoming ever more truly
multicultural, which means by definition the inclusion of many more
groups within a social order. Each of these groups has its own set of
heroes and villains; what is more to the point, perhaps, is that one
particular group's heroes may be the villains of another group. This
obviously raises special problems for anyone seeking to create a
"common culture" that can bind its many different groups. This has,
perhaps, been a reality of American culture even from the beginning.
After all, we express an important hope in the national motto, e
pluribus unum, ° even if we are ever more aware of the challenges
posed by paying adequate attention to the social dignity of each
element of the pluribus as we maintain a desire to meld them into
some kind of unum.
41
I cannot forbear, in this context, from elaborating on my earlier
reference to the work of Jay Greene and his associates tellingly titled
What's in a Name? The Decline in the Civic Mission of School
Names.42 After studying school-naming practices in seven states, they
39. Exit the Boer Moss, TIME, Oct. 25, 1954, at 28, available at www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,823581,00.html.
40. Out of many, one.
41. Bartow well describes the political disputes surrounding the naming of a federal
courthouse after Matthew J. Perry, the first African American federal judge in South
Carolina, against the wishes of the ubiquitous Strom J. Thurmond that the new courthouse
be treated as an "annex" of the Strom J. Thurmond Courthouse. See Bartow, supra note
4, at 938-39. In a recent review of a book on Black politicians in the era of
Reconstruction, Columbia historian Eric Foner notes that "the pioneering black
predecessors have been all but forgotten. I know of only two examples of public
recognition in their home states-a school named for Robert Smalls in Beaufort[, South
Carolina,] and a Georgetown, South Carolina, park named for Joseph Rainey." Eric
Foner, Rooted in Reconstruction, THE NATION, Nov. 3, 2008, at 33 (reviewing PHILIP
DRAY, CAPITOL MEN: THE EPIC STORY OF RECONSTRUCTION THROUGH THE LIVES OF
THE FIRST BLACK CONGRESSMEN (2008)).
42. GREENE ET AL., supra note 11, at 2.
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concluded that there is a marked move away from naming schools
"after 'people worthy of emulation,' " including presidents, in favor of
presumably less controversial "natural" beings.43 Thus, in Florida
more than twice as many new schools have been named after
manatees than after George Washington.44  When Fayetteville,
Arkansas replaced its "aging" Thomas Jefferson Elementary School
with a brand new structure across the road, the name did not follow it
any more than the bricks.45 Nor did the school board name the new
school after, say, its former senator J. William Fulbright, a native of
Fayetteville and the president of the University of Arkansas before
going on to serve five terms in the Senate (where, among other things,
he worked to establish the extraordinary program of Fellowships that
bears his name), or after the Arkansas-born President William
Jefferson Clinton. Instead, the board "chose to name the school 'Owl
Creek,' after a small ditch with a trickle of water that runs by the
school."46 As Green and his co-authors write:
This shift from naming schools after people worthy of
emulation to naming schools after hills, trees, or animals raises
questions about the civic mission of public education and the
role that school names play in that civic mission. The names
that school boards give to schools both reflect and shape civic
values.47
Ironically, one civic value that may be suggested by the developments
they ascertain is a strong desire to avoid the social discord that could
potentially accompany naming a school after a discrete individual. It
is worth quoting them extensively:
The difficulty with naming a school after a person is that it may
provoke a debate over whether that person is worthy of
emulation. To some, Lincoln freed the slaves and preserved the
union, while to others he abused executive authority and
trampled states' rights. To some, Jefferson articulated the
founding principles of our nation, while to others he was a
slaveholder. In New Orleans, the school board voted in 1997 to
forbid naming schools after anyone who had owned slaves,
forcing the renaming of a school honoring George Washington.
Even naming a school after a local educator can provoke a
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3 (noting that while only five schools were named for "the father of our
country," a startling eleven schools were named after the "sea cow").
45. Id. at 1.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2.
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fight: why this educator instead of that one? It was following
just such an argument over naming a middle school after a local
educator that the Fayetteville school board decided that they
would rather honor ditches than dignitaries."
It is, of course, far easier to choose an anodyne name (and to
reject more controversial ones) for new buildings than to change the
names of existing ones, just as librarians are always more comfortable
offering some ostensible reason other than ideology for the refusal to
purchase a controversial new book than explaining the removal from
the shelves of an already purchased book.
To come far closer to home, I am certain that there would have
been no reason to hold this symposium were there not already in
existence a building on the University of North Carolina campus
named after Judge Thomas Ruffin. No one would seriously
recommend naming a new building after him-if for no other reason
than the fact that most modern universities gladly sell "naming rights"
to highest bidders who are often major corporations eager to gain
prestige (and, presumably, customers) through association with
presumptively highly respectable universities thought to be
committed to higher values than simple commercial gain.49 Nor,
perhaps, would there have been a symposium on "The Perils of Public
Memory: State v. Mann and Thomas Ruffin in History and Memory"
if there were a modern consensus that Judge Ruffin truly was the
equivalent of Daniel F. Malan or even Francisco Franco. The
symposium is evidence of a far more complex reality: there remains a
sufficiently widespread perception, either "nuanced" or "schizoid,"
that Judge Ruffin at once not only has feet-and perhaps even a
torso-of clay, but also possesses sufficient genuine merit as a figure
in North Carolina's legal history to justify the retention of his name
on an important building of North Carolina's leading public
university. Duke University (my own alma mater) may well have
similarly complex feelings and explanations about James Buchanan
Duke, both a great benefactor and one of the creators of the
48. Id.
49. The practice of such "name-selling" is a central focus of Bartow's article, supra
note 4, passim. She asks why they should be treated as "charitable deductions" rather
than the purchase of a particular form of commercial advertising. Id. at 930 ("[P]urchased
naming rights may promote the perception of charitable behavior on the part of the entity
that places its name on a building, but actually function as an advertising or promotional
effort. The corporation receives valuable visibility and the simultaneous deceptive illusion
of having been a generous benefactor.").
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particular modern tobacco industry and therefore responsible, at least
indirectly, for the deaths of millions.
In this context, I suspect that most scholars will find especially
important the articles by Eric Muller and Sally Greene that
demonstrate how flawed Ruffin may have been.0 It is frankly now
impossible to view Ruffin as the stern adherent to judicial role who
took upon himself the solemn-and terrible-duty of acting as the
"jurist" instead of the "moralist" when construing North Carolina's
law.51 Ruffin presented himself-and was accepted by no less than
Harriet Beecher Stowe-as an honorable judge who shared
Marshall's perception that "this Court must not yield to feelings
which might seduce it from the path of duty [but instead] must obey
the mandate of the law."52 One might, of course, criticize Marshall's
and Ruffin's philosophy of law and suggest that a correct
understanding of jurisprudence would have led them to understand
that "the path of duty" was more complex, and included more
opportunity to integrate "morality," than they recognized. 3 But
some people may legitimately see such a jurisprudential outlook as
tendentious and even anachronistic.
It is more serious to charge that Ruffin, the former investor in
slave-trading, exercised his undoubted judicial discretion on more
than one occasion to reinforce the claims of slave owners and,
concomitantly, the harshness of the slave system. Perhaps one wishes
to honor John Marshall, in spite of his having been a slave owner
who, as in The Antelope, gave aid and comfort to the partisans of
slavery, because one believes that he genuinely viewed himself as the
selfless servant of an unjust legal system that he did not himself
create. It would be substantially harder to honor him if one viewed
him as a more active agent in creating that legal order, though
perhaps one would still be tempted to engage in a "balancing test"
that found enough enduring positive contributions to American life to
outweigh more negative ones.
50. See generally Sally Greene, State v. Mann Exhumed, 87 N.C. L. REV. 701 (2009)
(arguing that neither the facts, nor the law, compelled Ruffin to overturn Mann's
conviction); Eric L. Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin and the Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C. L.
REV. 757 (2009) (identifying Ruffin as a batterer of slaves, a speculating slave trader at a
time when that trade had become disreputable, and a serial breaker of slave families).
51. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 114 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.). I discuss
Marshall's opinion in SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 66-67, 160-70
(1988).
52. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) at 114.
53. See Hercules, Abraham Lincoln, the United States Constitution, and the Problem of
Slavery, in RONALD DWORKIN 136-67 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007).
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Indeed, when asked by friends to describe the point of my book
Written in Stone, I usually say that the central question it asks is
whether it is "Stalinist" to tear down public statues of Stalin (or
Leninist to substitute St. Petersburg for Leningrad). After all, one of
the central symbols of the ill-fated Hungarian revolution of 1956 was
precisely the tearing down of such a statue,54 just as a symbol of the
far more successful 1991 overthrow of Soviet Russia was the
demolition by a public mob of the statue honoring Dzerzhinsky.55
The destruction of civic monuments has become a central symbol of
revolutionary transformation.56 There was a reason why the United
States more or less engineered the televised destruction of a statue of
Saddam Hussein to accompany what was then perceived as the
unequivocally victorious arrival of American troops in Baghdad in
2003. It was one thing to declare that Hussein was no longer in
power; it was quite another to demonstrate this through the iconic
destruction of what was itself an iconic statue.
I take it as a given that no serious argument supports the notion
that there is a "public duty" of a new political regime to preserve
54. See DARIO GAMBONI, THE DESTRUCTION OF ART: ICONOCLASM AND
VANDALISM SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 58-60 (1997).
55. Id. at 52-54.
56. As Eric Muller has suggested in an e-mail commenting on an earlier draft
of this Article:
[T]here is virtually no history in this country of pulling down statues and shifting
portraits to the storage closet. Indeed, by comparison to many other countries,
there is little history even of significant public debate about pulling statues down.
(As you note, there is an emerging American tradition of avoiding the whole
problem by naming new buildings after natural objects and putting up new statues
to currently preferred heroes (Pocohantas [sic] rather than Sir Walter Raleigh)-
but that's not the same thing.) It's yet another brand of American exceptionalism:
we've pretty much never encountered a prominent figure whom we're willing to
truly demote or dethrone.
What explains this? Have American wrongdoers just somehow been less bad
than their counterparts in other countries, such that the voice for preservation and
continued honor always stays stronger in public debate? (I doubt that.) Have
American advocates for reform of the "tutelary landscape" always been less
confident and effective in their advocacy than their overseas counterparts?
(Perhaps.) Is there a uniquely American culture of forgetting the ugliest parts of
our collective past? (Perhaps.) Surely there are other explanatory candidates as
well.
E-mail from Eric Muller, Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor in Jurisprudence and
Ethics, University of North Carolina School of Law, to author (Apr. 27, 2008) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). Professor Muller raises a number of extremely
interesting questions that are beyond the scope of this essay. One might ask if the
"American exceptionalism" that he suggests is something, if true, to praise or to question.
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public statues of hated tyrants like Joseph Stalin or Saddam Hussein
or even to preserve the names of public spaces, including great cities,
designed to memorialize, or as in the case of Stalingrad honor even
while alive, such figures. The street map of contemporary Budapest
features many different names from the pre-1989 maps.57 I would be
shocked if this was not true also of post-conquest street maps of
Baghdad. But it is equally true that almost all of us would wish to put
limits on the "creative destruction" allowed any new political regime,
especially with regard to the material artifacts that are constitutive of
a now-displaced culture.
I would be quite surprised, for example, if anyone reading this
essay would defend the wanton, decidedly "uncreative" destruction
by the Taliban regime of the great Buddhist monuments,58 regarded
by the Taliban as a culturally dangerous endorsement of infidels.
Nor, I am sure, would there be any sympathies for a contemporary
Egyptian regime that decided to demonstrate its own newfound
commitment to a culture of human rights by tearing down even one of
the remarkable memorials to the Pharaohs, however much we might
agree that they were in fact tyrants unworthy of the slightest
emulation in today's world. At some point, all of us would agree that
"the demands of history" or "the claims of our collective culture"
take precedence over even the most justified political opposition to
those particular people or events that are memorialized. There is
something truly totalitarian about the notion that public space must
be completely "cleansed" of reminders of past evil. But defending
the non-destruction of such reminders may require considerable
intellectual agility.
One way of defending the maintenance of such artifacts is to
attempt to focus on public monuments entirely through the lenses of
aesthetics or history, which requires, among other things, the basic
turning away from the explicit political or cultural content attached to
them at the time of their creation. Just as atheists can devote
themselves to the appreciation of the beauties and artistic
achievements of Italian painters who believed that they were engaged
57. See Emilia Palonen, The City-Text in Post-Communist Budapest: Street Names,
Memorials, and the Politics of Commemoration, 73 GEOJOURNAL 219, 221 (2008),
available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/9355128366654242/fulltext.pdf ("The
Hungarian method of rewriting the city-text at every change of political system expunges
discredited figures from the landscape.").
58. See Amir Shah, Taliban Destroy Ancient Buddhist Relics, THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 3, 2001, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/
taliban-destroy-ancient-buddhist-relics-694425.html.
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in a common enterprise of glorifying God, so can we brush off the
particular characters of Pharaohs 9 or similar tyrants by reference to
the almost literally breath-taking aesthetic achievements of the
ancient sculptors. I am confident that if the Roman Forum contained
any public sculpture honoring Nero or Caligula, there would be
passionate opposition to the suggestion that it be removed from
public view merely because these particular emperors were unusually,
perhaps even uniquely, dreadful. "Culture" becomes defined as an
aesthetic appreciation of the material achievements of past, often
dead, cultures rather than any genuine engagement with the
normative "cultures" they represent. Many people, after all, continue
to venerate Bach's Passions based upon the writings of St. Matthew
and St. John as among the highest achievements of "Western culture"
by simply ignoring or otherwise distancing themselves from the anti-
Judaism that is rife particularly in the latter.60
My very examples immediately above, however, suggest that
such aestheticizing or historicizing moves may be much easier to
make (and to be found tolerable) the more distant the past and,
perhaps, the more the sheer ignorance about the specific events or
persons that might be commemorated. Of course, the time periods of
what might be termed "cultural states of limitation" may themselves
vary across cultures. The world would surely be better off if
Protestants in Northern Ireland did not remain fixated on events that
occurred in the seventeenth century or if Kosovars and Serbs could
just forget, in some sense, a fourteenth century battle and its
aftermath. Many might have similar views about "the remembrance
of things past" with regard to Israel and Palestine. But do we, in
2009, really counsel such "cultural amnesia" with regard to the role of
slavery in American political and legal culture? Recall Ronald
Reagan's visit in 1986 to the cemetery at Bitburg, Germany, which
included graves of SS officers; forty-or now sixty-years does not
begin to be sufficient to eliminate the particular valence attached to
Nazism (as contrasted, perhaps, with ordinary Germans who served
59. See, e.g., ARNOLD BLUMBERG, GREAT LEADERS, GREAT TYRANTS?:
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF WORLD RULERS WHO MADE HISTORY 1 (discussing
Akhenaten, described by his critics as a "physically and mentally dysfunctional tyrant bent
on destroying traditional Egyptian society in order to establish himself as an absolute
divine-right monarch"). And, of course, there is the quintessentially tyrannical Pharaoh
who refused Moses' plea to "let my people go," commemorated every year at the Passover
Seder. Exodus 8:20-11:10.
60. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance
Notes on "The Banjo Serenader" and "the Lying Crowd of Jews," 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
1513, 1525-29 (1999).
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their country for "patriotic," rather than "ideological," reasons).
Similarly, I believe that the United States made a grievous error in
according, even by the 1880s, equal respect and dignity to those who
fought on both sides of our own Civil War.6 At the very least, this
enterprise in reforging national unity (at least between the white
North and South) required overlooking the fact that the
Confederacy's principal project was the maintenance of racialist
chattel slavery, and, not at all coincidentally, the period coincided
with the development of the racialist politics that culminated in the
Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson.62
I include, in my book, a series of possible responses to the
domination of the Texas public landscape, at least with regard to the
state Capitol, by these monuments to the Confederacy and, therefore,
implicitly to the racist culture for which it spoke. These range from
destroying the monument to the Confederate dead to adding a brand
new monument honoring either slaves or the Union soldiers whose
victory liberated the slaves. A more "moderate" solution, perhaps, is
moving the offensive statue from the "sacred space" of the Capitol
grounds to the Texas State Historical Museum.
III. RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN "CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION" AND FIDELITY TO THE PAST
So the dilemma is this: fidelity to the past, including what we
today regard as the heritage of our common culture, may have its
claims, but common sense teaches us that it cannot be the case that all
pasts are worth cherishing. Not all pasts have any moral claim on
those public spaces that are used for the formation of our
contemporary cultures and the creation of heritages that we hope to
hand down to our progeny. Whatever one thinks of the present
government of Zimbabwe, it is surely the case that there was no duty
to keep the original colonial name of Southern Rhodesia, or to
maintain in the space surrounding its capitol statues of British
imperialist Cecil Rhodes,63 not to mention continuing to name its
capital after Lord Salisbury. Perhaps someone might oppose the
replacement of a statue of Cecil Rhodes by one of current President
61. See generally DAVID BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN
AMERICAN MEMORY (2001) (discussing the "public memory" of the Civil War in
America).
62. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
63. See generally ARTHUR KEPPEL, RHODES AND RHODESIA: THE WHITE
CONQUEST OF ZIMBABWE, 1884-1902 (1983) (discussing the British "conquest" of
Zimbabwe and Zambia).
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Robert Mugabe because of substantive (and altogether merited)
views about the unworthiness of Mr. Mugabe, who has become a
quite terrible tyrant himself. Were we speaking instead of South
Africa, though, it would be as bizarre to claim that a statue of Nelson
Mandela should not replace one of Mr. Rhodes or, even more to the
point, statues honoring the architects of the apartheid regime, as
doing so would be tantamount to proclaiming the necessity of keeping
unchanged the name of what used to be the Daniel F. Malan
International Airport in Cape Town. Thomas Jefferson famously said
that the earth belonged to the living and that constant revolutions
were useful to prevent the remnants of a dead past from limiting
future possibility. 64 But this is just to say that there is always a tension
between the claims for recognition and honor by our ancestors and
the necessity to reject those claims and, in some sense, to destroy
their purported heritage in the name of generating hopeful futures for
ourselves and our descendants.
How, then, can we resolve this dilemma? There are, as already
suggested, what might be termed "intermediate" solutions, such as
the displacement of public monuments from "sacred space" in front
of capitol buildings, great public plazas, or national cemeteries to
museums. One purpose of museums, after all, is to put such artifacts
in their place, so to speak, by transforming them from tutelary objects
to historicized emblems of a past that may well be viewed as no
longer possessing a genuine normative claim on us today. An
especially vivid example of such a transformation, at least for me, was
a 2004-2005 exhibition at the Guggenheim Museum in New York of
objects exemplifying "the Aztec empire" in Mexico. It was certainly
a striking exhibit, but even the cosmopolitan and multicultural exhibit
designers at the Guggenheim could not completely ignore the fact
that Aztec culture was in many ways horrendous. As a review in The
New York Times noted, Aztec
[p]risoners were the raw material for rituals of human sacrifice
... that the Aztecs took to exceptional lengths. On religious
holidays, of which they had many, thousands of victims might
be killed, their hearts torn out or their skin stripped off, and
64. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Ambassador to France, to James
Madison, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 6, 1789), available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch2s23.htm. A useful compendium
of Jefferson's often quite vivid quotations about revolution and its desirability can be
found at http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/eff1770.htm.
65. See Guggenheim Museum, The Aztec Empire, http://www.albany.edu/ims/
GuggenheimAztecSummary.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
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their blood smeared like a nourishing liquid over the mouths of
temple sculptures.66
One need not applaud Spanish imperialism in Mexico to believe
that, on balance, the world is better off with the destruction of the
Aztec culture based on such traditions of blood sacrifice of human
beings, not to mention an extraordinary Aztec class system that kept
most in absolute privation while rulers lived in relative luxury. One
could, then, admire the Aztec objects on formal aesthetic grounds-
some of them were indeed beautiful-if one had distinctly mixed
feelings about the destruction of an oppressive Aztec culture at the
hands of Spanish conquerors who, of course, had their own cultural
imperfections.
These feelings were altogether different from the lament I
experienced in response to the victory of Alexander the Great over
the weakened Athenians and what remained of their democracy.
Indeed, perhaps even more to the point was the decided ambivalence
generated during a trip to Spain about the "reconquest" of Iberia by
Christians and the consequent demise of a form of Islam almost
certainly more tolerant than the Catholicism of Ferdinand and
Isabella that replaced it. The Alhambra in Granada is not only a
place of great beauty, but amply deserving of its place in any register
of great sites in the world; we should also confront the possibility that
it may well represent a better civilization than the one that replaced
it. This is almost certainly not true of many other past societies whose
beautiful artifacts were in almost no sense matched by the quality of
the overall social orders in which they were created.
In any event, there is obviously much to be said for the
preservation even of the artifacts of thoroughly dreadful past cultures
in museums. Not only may the artifacts be aesthetically beautiful, as
with the Aztecs. It is also the case that one aspect of becoming
culturally sophisticated is the realization that there is no particular
connection between aesthetic creations of the highest order and
normative goodness. Just as quite despicable individuals can produce
great works of music or art, so is the same true of broader cultures.
"Culture," from an anthropological or historical perspective, is a
positivist notion referring to the ways that people have organized
themselves and made the world meaningful; it is not a normative
notion declaring that whatever human beings have created is
66. Holland Cotter, A Lost Culture, Drenched in Blood and Beauty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 2004, at E29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/lO/15/arts/design/15COTT.
html.
[Vol. 87
POLITICS OF PUBLIC HONOR
automatically worthy of admiration. None of us could make sense of
the dynamic cultures within which we all live if we truly believed that
whatever cultures existed in the past are worthy of maintenance and
continued emulation. We are all the more-or-less grateful
beneficiaries of the creative destruction of various forms of stifling
past cultures (as well, to be sure, of the destruction of cultures that
might well have deserved to flourish).
What I am calling the "museum solution," i.e., the movement of
public art from its original public space to the enclosed space of a
historical (and historicizing) museum, may serve as a kind of
midpoint between the full-scale destruction (and subsequent
forgetting) of artifacts and their maintenance as valuable parts of our
complex cultural heritage even if they no longer play the particular
kind of tutelary role for which many of them were originally designed.
Still, one should not believe that this is a truly "neutral" solution.
Those who in fact share a veneration of the persons or causes
memorialized will object to the quite explicit political and cultural
meanings of such displacement. Upon seeing that his statue was
being removed from a central public space to the National Museum
of Zimbabwe, someone who really admired Cecil Rhodes, for
example, would scarcely be assuaged by a response such as "Well, at
least we are not completely destroying it." And, of course, this new
national museum is scarcely likely to honor Rhodes even as it
recognizes the undoubted role that he played in the formation of
what became Zimbabwe.
It should also be recognized that at least some persons on "the
other side" may in fact wish only destruction, so that placing the
object-and, symbolically, its honoree-in a state museum would still
convey more public esteem than might be felt merited. Would a
German art museum, for example, display a portrait of Hitler,
whatever might be thought to be its aesthetic merits? Many Nazi
objects, of course, can be found in museums devoted to the explicit
history of the foundations of World War II, but all such museums that
I have seen leave no doubt about their disdain for the Nazis. Such
museums are fully tutelary in their aims.
Whatever the merits of the "museum solution" in some
instances, it is scarcely sufficient to resolve the tensions generated by
some of the examples in this paper, including, of course, the particular
building named after Judge Ruffin that triggered this symposium.
Some artifacts, after all, depend for their power on occupying certain
spaces. Few would have accepted a Taliban solution of moving the
Buddhist statues that were destroyed to a museum in Kabul,
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ostensibly so that more Afghans could have had the opportunity to
see these important remnants of the Afghan past. (Though, if I am
correct in my assumption, then one should ask why the movement by
Lord Elgin of the Parthenon friezes does not generate similar outrage
and a demand that the British Museum return its ill-gotten goods.)67
Or, should someone object to the gigantic tribute to King Victor
Emmanuel in Rome, either because one is anti-monarchist or because
one identifies its particular architectural style with fascism, it would
scarcely be possible to offer as a compromise the solution of moving it
to another location. There is no feasible alternative between leaving
it where it is, which accepts its dominating the part of Rome in which
it is built, or destroying it, and I presume that no one would seriously
suggest the latter.
In any case it should be obvious that the "museum solution,"
even if attractive in some instances, can scarcely work at all. And
even if it is a perfect solution to what should happen to one particular
statue of a now-discredited public figure that might have graced the
capitol grounds or the center of the major public square, it does not
tell us what to do with what may be the many other statues of that
figure that pervaded the public landscape as part of the tutelary
project. A museum may "need" one statue of Stalin or Saddam, but
there is no conceivable need for a dozen such artifacts. Thus, there is
no escaping the question of when it is permissible to destroy a given
public artifact-and transform a given public space-in the name of
new cultural values.
These various partial solutions, such as moving certain artifacts
from one location to another, obviously work only with regard to
tangibles. The problem presented by the subject of our symposium,
the Ruffin Residence Hall, or by the similar Simkins Hall at the
University of Texas, is that the problem is not really the building per
se, but, rather the name attached to it. Even if the Ruffin Residence
Hall, unlike much larger edifices, could be physically moved to the
periphery of the University of North Carolina campus, that wouldn't
efface its name, which is the heart of the controversy. With regard to
names, there appear to be no intermediate solutions. It either
remains or is erased.
Having set out at some length the dilemma, the obvious question
is whether there is indeed a principle that will support the destruction
of statues of Joseph Stalin or Saddam Hussein that does not offer aid
67. See generally CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, THE ELGIN MARBLES: SHOULD THEY
BE RETURNED TO GREECE? (1998) (answering in the affirmative).
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and comfort to what we would probably regard as a crazed ideologue
who would wish to do the same with statues of Ramses II in Lower
Egypt, Trajan in Rome, or one or another of the disreputable Borgias
who contributed so much to the making of Florence. And, as
suggested, renamings may present the same overall problem with the
absence of "intermediate" solutions. In any event, it is in answering
this question that I perhaps display my colors as an American lawyer.
Because I doubt seriously that any single overarching abstract
principle exists, I am inclined to argue that decisions must always be
made pragmatically, which means in effect the contextual balancing
of interests and values that distinguishes a "common-law" from a
"civil-law" sensibility. There may well be an interest in fidelity to
history, but there is very often a counter-balancing interest in the
right of a living generation, representing a new (and better?) political
consciousness, to redo its own public landscape even at the cost of
"creative destruction."
Still, even in the absence of hard-and-fast principles, there
remain at least two procedural points that may offer some help. The
first involves the classic issue of burden of proof. should the
preservationist or the transformationist bear the burden of
demonstrating that advisability of keeping in place or changing a
particular venue? From one perspective, it may not matter much if
the only purpose of a burden-of-persuasion rule is to decide who wins
in the case of a genuine equilibrium. Most of the time, one suspects,
analysts would agree that one side has the better of the argument,
even if only by a slight measure. Things get more complicated, of
course, if one sets a higher standard of persuasion, so that, for
example, one would have to demonstrate by "clear and convincing
evidence" that the status quo should be changed or, concomitantly,
that it should be maintained against the desires of those now
exercising political control-and does it matter whether they can
plausibly claim to speak in behalf of a popular majority?-to reshape
public space. My own inclination would be to place the burden on
those desiring change, but to limit, relatively speaking, the
onerousness of the burden. "Clear and convincing" strikes me as
demanding too much from those who wish to change things, though,
of course, we might demand at least such a burden with regard to
certain special sites that merit, for example, the designation "world
heritage." Indeed, for such sites, we might well demand a "beyond
reasonable doubt" standard before allowing significant (or any?)
modification. This "sliding scale" approach makes ever more
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important the process of identifying a site as possessing such
significance.
Thus we move to a second important question, which is, who
precisely gets to assess the quality of the arguments on behalf of
labeling some sites as truly special and, in turn, weighing the arguments
between preservationists and transformationists? As Professor Bartow
suggests, "[flairness in strictly honorific naming practices, where no
monetary donations are involved, would seem to require a fairly clear
set of principles that direct the procedure."68 This is, obviously, far
easier said than done. One can imagine possibilities ranging from
electorally accountable public institutions, such as city councils or
legislatures, to more detached public commissions, to citizen juries or,
finally, to judges.69 And, of course, there is a subset of questions
attached to such a decision. Should, for example, public commissions
consist of trained professionals, including historians or art critics, or,
instead, of "local notables" whose legitimacy is based more on
presumptive popular esteem than the possession of relevant
professional training? And, finally, to what degree should such
decision-making bodies be local or even national, as against
international?
If, after all, one can seriously speak of a "world heritage" with
regard to cultural sites or artifacts,7" then it seems ill-advised not to
include "the world" in the decision-making process. This would help
to guard against the possibility that a given national regime will
underweigh the ostensible interest of all (culturally sensitive) humans
in maintaining given cultural sites or artifacts, as most certainly
happened in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Obviously, international
"'representation" can be provided by lobbyists who attempt to
influence those with actual decision-making power. What would be
better, presumably, would be actual voting power, even if it is difficult
to imagine how this would be guaranteed, especially in a country like
the United States that is currently undergoing a fit of unseemly
parochialism with regard to the views of anyone outside the United
States.
68. Bartow, supra note 4, at 969.
69. Professor Bartow even suggests auctioning off naming rights, though, as she notes,
this "would probably mean that wealthy people would garner an even larger share of the
quasi-trademarked public domain than they do now. The process would open naming
rights up to people from underrepresented groups, but only wealthy ones." Id.
70. See, e.g., United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
("UNESCO"), World Heritage Centre, World Heritage List, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/
(last visited Jan. 26, 2009) (listing 878 properties "which the World Heritage Committee
considers as having outstanding universal value").
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But even if we remain resolutely within the borders of the
United States, we might still debate whether "non-local" or even
"national" representatives are entitled to make decisions about
changes in the public landscape and monuments of given states and
cities. Who, after all, constitutes the relevant community to
determine the suitability of continuing to honor Judge Ruffin? It is, I
think, implausible to suggest that it consists only of current students
and faculty at the University of North Carolina. I would want to add
at least all current and former citizens of North Carolina, such as
myself, who continue to identify in some sense with the state even if
our legal residence has long since moved elsewhere. But perhaps one
could argue that residents of other states have a stake in whether
North Carolina continues to valorize slave owners and legal
apologists for slavery. Is it unthinkable that someone in Hawaii or
Alaska might nonetheless be entitled to participate in the debate?
CONCLUSION
Multiculturalism is a pervasive part of the human reality. Today
we most often think of multiculturalism in a "horizontal" dimension,
where living cultures interact with one another, for good and for ill,
and where we necessarily wrestle with the complex questions of how
sometimes antagonistic cultures make their peace with one another.
But there is also a "vertical" dimension to multiculturalism as well,
inasmuch as existing cultures are built, sometimes quite literally, on
the ruins of past cultures, with ever-present questions looming as to
what duties, if any, we the living owe to the material legacy of the
past.71 Of course, the vertical and horizontal intersect whenever
contemporary cultures claim a connection, however attenuated, with
these past artifacts. At that point, needless to say, conversations (and
controversies) no longer involve "historic preservationists" and
"developers," but, often larger parts of the community who see
decisions as involving their legitimate place in the social order.
Whatever our sympathies in particular controversies, it is facile
to suggest that there is a strong right to maintain all material aspects
of a given culture, including the names assigned to public buildings,
71. An especially vivid example is the controversy surrounding the Negro Burial
Ground in lower Manhattan and the legitimacy of displacing it with new buildings. See
Brent Staples, Editorial, Manhattan's African Dead, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1995, at A14,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE1DB1331F931A15756
COA963958260. Similar questions, of course, are raised by the propriety of redeveloping
another part of lower Manhattan on the site of the ostensibly "sacred space" of the
September 11, 2001 attacks.
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given the dynamism attached particularly to economic and political
transformations. Creative destruction is a given. The best that can
realistically be hoped for is that we become more sensitive to the
costs, as well as the benefits, of such development and try to minimize
the amount of unnecessary destruction and emotional suffering
attached to it. But those most committed to the cultures being swept
aside can scarcely be expected to agree with those doing the sweeping
on what count as costs and what as benefits. And there appears to be
no Olympian perspective that allows us confidently to adjudicate the
inevitable disputes that will arise whenever destruction looms.
